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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED R. LAW and ) 
GERTRUDE R. LAW, · 
husband and wife,· . 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
UINTA OIL REFINING COMPANY, 
a corporation, and 
UTAH COOPERATIVE 
ASSOCIATION, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
FACTS 
\ 
\ Case No. 9333 
Plaintiffs in this case were Mr. and Mrs. Law, but 
~Ir. Law died after the action was filed and before trial. 
Mrs. Law, as Administratrix of her deceased husband's 
estate, was substituted in his place. 
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It was stipulated by the parties during the trial that 
the resultant damage to plaintiffs was in the sum of 
$46,119.11. 
The jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs 
and against the defendants and assessed the damages at 
the stipulated sum of $46,119.11. Judgment on the ver-
dict was thereupon entered in favor of the plaintiffs in 
the amount of $46,119.11, with interest at six per cent' 
(6%) from September 19, 1957, to date of entry of judg-
ment, April20, 1960, in the sum of $4,381.27, together with 
costs in the amount of $134.00. 
Defendants denied responsibility for the explosion 
and fire, and it was on this issue that the jury ruled 
against the defendants. However, defendants contended 
at trial and now again contend on this appeal that the 
plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving that neg-
ligence of the defendants caused the explosion and fire to 
occur. In fact, defendants insist that plaintiffs never 
offered any evidence of causation chargeable to defend-
ants. Now let's review the important facts as shown by 
the record. 
Defendants, pursuant to an order from plaintiffs de-
livered white gasoline in bulk to plaintiffs on September 
19, 1957. This gasoline as brought to plaintiffs' place by 
defendants in a tractor and tanker trailer (Tr. 25). The 
trailer was backed into the place of delivery by defend-
ants' employee, Webb (Tr. 58). Webb asked plaintiffs' 
employee, Shaw, where to unload the gasoline. Shaw re-
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plied that he didn't know, so Webb asked Burdick, an-
other employee of plaintiff, where to unload. (Tr. 58) 
Burdick showed Webb where to back in to unload, and 
Webb backed in as directed. (Tr. 69) Burdick instructed 
Webb how to connect the hoses and unload the gasoline, 
and Burdick opened the appropriate valves and turned 
on the switch to activate the motor and pump. (Tr. 77) 
Webb hooked up the tanker to unload it and then asked 
Burdick if it was properly hooked up. Burdick inspected 
it and advised Webb that it was hooked up properly. ( Tr. 
69) Burdick suggested to Webb that he should check the 
tank to see if it was draining. (Tr. 77) Webb broke the 
seal on the hatch of the tanker trailer and announced 
that it was draining okay. (Tr. 78-79) Burdick said it ap-
peared to be properly connected up for pumping opera-
tion from the trailer tank into the storage tank. (Tr. 78) 
No fuel was leaking from any connections and there was 
no odor of gasoline fumes or anything unusual observed 
by Burdick. (Tr. 78) The switch to turn on the electric 
pump motor was on the outside of the storage tank build-
ing. Some time after Webb asked Shaw where to unload 
the gasoline, Shaw left the station to order sandwiches 
for himself and Burdick at the adjacent cafe. ( Tr. 61) 
While he was ordering the sandwiches Shaw saw Webb 
in the cafe drinking a cup of coffee. (Tr. 62) Shaw did 
not wait for the sandwiches, but Burdick came over for 
them about fifteen or twenty minutes after Shaw had 
ordered them. ( Tr. 71) Burdick saw Webb sitting at the 
counter in the cafe when he picked up the sandwiches. 
( Tr. 71) In going to the cafe and returning to the sta-
tion Burdick did not see any gasoline on the hard-surfaced 
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area or in the line of his path, (Tr. 71) and Shaw did not 
see any gaoline or smell any gasoline fumes, while he 
was en route to and from the cafe. (Tr. 61) Shaw and 
Burdick had just finished their lunch when the first explo-
sion occurred and fire started. ( Tr. 72) 
Olsen, a service station operator located about a block 
and a half north of the site of the fire, was driving north-
erly towards his own station when he passed "Oil City" 
(the site of the fire) and noticed gasoline running down 
the curb along the highway. This was before the explo-
sion and fire. He said it was coming from the storage 
tank area and running downhill. He identified it as gaso-
line by the smell and the vapors arising therefrom. (Tr. 
83) Olsen said the gasoline was flowing for about 350 
feet in distance, and though he knew it to be gasoline 
and to be flowing from a certain area he drove on to his 
own place of business without stopping, (Tr. 85-86) and 
just as he was getting out of his car he heard an explo-
sion. (Tr. 84) 
Mr. Stanfield, an automotive repairman and mechanic 
said that as he left his place of business for lunch he saw 
smoke starting to raise from the direction of ''Oil City.'' 
( Tr. 89) As they approached "Oil City" he saw fire in 
the gutter continuous up to the back of the tanker from 
somewhere near the billboard. (Tr. 90) 
Mr. Marx, an employee of the Price School Board, 
was eating lunch in the cafe adjacent to "Oil City" 
when he heard the explosion and turned and saw the 
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flames. As he left the cafe he heard a cry and then saw 
a man coming out in the flame from the area just on the 
other side of the tanker from in between the tanker and 
the end of the building or service station. (Tr. 93-94) 
The man coming out of the fire was the driver of the 
gasoline tanker, Mr. Webb. (Tr. 99) Mr. Marx ran to 
Mr. Webb and assisted him as best he could, wrapping 
a blanket around him to put orit the fire and getting him 
out of the flames. About all Webb said which could be 
understood was that he was in so much plain he asked 
to be killed. ( Tr. 93) He never said how the fire started. 
(Tr. 94) Mr. Webb died (Tt. 76) and no one offered any 
other testimony about any statements made by Webb be-
fore his death. 
Several of the witnesses called by plaintiffs (Law, 
Burdick, Gilson) testified in some detail about the physi-
cal layout of the storage building and tank into which 
the gasoline was being pumped. The building itself was 
corrugated tin on three sides and the roof, and cinder 
block on the fourth side. It was loosely put together. 
(Tr. 13) The storage tank inside this building was steel 
with dimensions of six feet high by six feet wide by 
twelve feet long. It sat substantially on the floor of the 
storage area so that the top of it was six feet off the 
ground. (Tr. 46) The tank was sealed all around except 
for a welded 2V2-inch diameter vent· which protruded 
2% inches beyond the top of the tank, and to which a 
rigid pipe was attached which extended upwards about 
2% feet above the tin roof. (Tr. 20, 24, 43, 73-74 and 
78-79 and 106) There was a hole in the roof much larger 
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than the vent pipe, the hole being about six or eight inches 
in diameter. (Tr. 74) The electric motor which operated 
the pump to fill and drain this tank was located on the 
ground, inside the storage building at the northwest cor-
ner of the tank. ( Tr. 46) Except for the holes in the 
vent and the pipes from the valve controls the tank was 
completely sealed so that the only way it could be over-
flowed would be to gusher it out of the top of the vent 
under pumping pressure. ( Tr. 106) 
Plaintiff rested without any witness ever giving any 
evidence of what caused the explosion and fire to occur. 
Neither Shaw, Burdick, Olsen, Stansfield, Marx, nor Gil-
son, plaintiffs' remaining witnesses, offered any evidence 
of causation of the fire or explosion. 
Not one witness called by plaintiffs in putting on 
their case in chief offered any evidence as to the cause of 
the explosion or fire. In fact, the only discussion of this 
point by any of plaintiffs' witnesses was plaintiff Law's 
evidence as follows : 
'' Q. Did you know what caused the explosion~ 
''A. No, I don't. 
"Q. That is, where the spark came from~ 
"A. No, I don't." (Tr. 34) 
Immediately after plaintiff rested defendants moved 
the court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
under the law and facts, plaintiffs showed no basis for 
relief. Counsel stated in making his motion that the roost 
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and best that can be said as to defendants "responsi-
bility is the wildest type of speculation and conjecture." 
(Tr. 96 and 107) The court denied this motion, thus com-
pelling defendants to proceed. (Tr. 96) 
Defendants' witnesses offered the following word 
picture: 
An explosion followed by :fire occurred while Mr. 
Prazen was eating in the adjacent cafe. He ran out and 
saw Mr. Webb, his clothing afire, come out of the fire area . 
. Mr. Prazen and Mr. Marx grabbed Mr. Webb, wrapping 
him in a blanket and taking him to the hospital. The :fire 
was coming from between the tank and the service sta-
tion building. (Tr. 109) 
Mr. Davies, called by defendants, testified that he 
was a diesel mechanic and service station attendant em-
ployed about one block from ''Oil City.'' As he was pass-
ing ''Oil City'' in his car he heard a loud but muffled 
explosion "like it came from within a building." He 
noticed the :fire, and being afraid of further explosions he 
drove on a short distance and stopped oncoming traffic. 
After doing this Mr. Davies walked back up to ''Oil City.'' 
~lr. Davies was asked whether, as he walked back up, he 
ran into any :fire along the highway. He answered that 
the :fire was starting to run from the front of the storage 
area down the gutter, but at that time it was just in front 
of the station. ( Tr. 111) 
Mr. Mills, Fire Chief, Price, Utah, testified that he 
heard the muffled explosion, and shortly thereafter 
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(about five to seven minutes) received a fire call. He 
took the fire truck to the scene of the fire arriving there 
about seven or eight minutes after the receiptof the fire 
call. Thus he arrived at the fire about twelve to fifteen min-
utes after the explosion. (Tr. 114) There was no fire up 
and down the street when he arrived, only five to ten feet 
in front of the building. (Tr. 114) 
Mr. Hatch, Assistant Manager, Uinta Oil Refining 
Co., testified that he was in Salt Lake City when the ex-
plosion and fire occurred, but that he was advised by 
telephone and immediately left for Price, arriving there 
between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., that day. (Tr. 117) He ex-
amined the trailer which delivered the gasoline to ''Oil 
City" and found it to be entirely dry of white gasoline. 
From an examination of the company records, Mr. Hatch 
testified that 2137 gallons of white gasoline had been in 
the trailer for delivery. (Tr. 119) When he examined 
the trailer the fire valve and the rising stem valve were 
both closed, and the hatch covering was also closed. (Tr. 
120) Mr. Hatch testified that there was a well-recognized 
custom in regard to unloading operations, which custom is 
for the driver to position his trailer, and hook up his un-
loading hoses. The station attendant is then asked to open 
the loading hatch and break the seals, and check the fluid 
level of the trailer. After that is completed the custom is 
that the driver has no more to do with the unloading. 
(Tr. 121) The station attendant or operator starts the 
pumping operations under this custom. (Tr. 122) On 
cross-examination, Mr. Hatch testified that he didn't 
know whether any of these customs were actually fol-
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lowed on this particular day - and he didn't know 
whether all of the gasoline was actually emptied from 
the trailer into the storage tank, but that the trailer was 
empty when he examined it. ( Tr. 122) 
Dr. Cook, Professor of metallurgy and director of 
the institute of metals and explosive research at the Uni-
versity of Utah, was next called by the defendants as an 
expert witness. His special training and experience in 
the :field of explosives includes: 
''A. Upon graduating from Yale, I was a re-
search chemist on explosives for Dupont Company 
in Gibbstown, New Jersey, for ten years. And then 
after being at the University of Utah as professor 
of metallurgy for four years I set up, at the re-
quest of the U.S. Navy, the institute of metals and 
explosives research. At that time it was known 
as the explosives research group at the University 
of Utah, and since then we have carried out a large 
Government project on explosives. In the four 
years between my employment with Dupont and 
setting up this institute, I served as a consultant 
and expert witness on the Texas City explosion 
case. On the railroad reparations cases. On Riss 
and Company, petitioners for transportation of 
explosives, and a number of other federal cases 
having to do with explosives business.'' 
Dr. Cook then testified that five very significant facts 
were evident from an examination of the evidence in this 
case. These five significant facts were: 
1. Where the initial or more powerful explosion 
occurred - i. e., in the region of the storage 
tank. ( Tr. 125-126) 
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2. The vent pipe found on top of the storage tank 
after the explosion was not attached at the 
time of the explosion as witnessed by the ero-
sion of the female threads, instead of the shear-
ing of them. (Tr. 127-128) 
3. The top of the storage tank had been bulged 
up and outward, indicating an explosion had 
occurred inside the tank, but it was a less pow-
erful explosion than had occurred outside the 
tank. (Tr. 128-129) 
4. A single phase General Electric motor unpro-
tected for sparking was located next to the stor-
age tank, inside the storage shed. This is ex-
tremely hazardous for use around gasoline, as 
sparks from such a motor can ignite gasoline 
vapor air mixture. Dr. Cook testified that a 
three phase non-explosion vapor proof motor 
without exposure of sparks was required for 
operational conditions such as involved herein. 
(Tr.129). 
5. The corrugated sheet metal forming the wall 
next to the storage tank was burned on the in-
side and not the outside. ( Tr. 129) 
From these five evidentiary facts Dr. Cook concluded 
that the first main explosion occurred in the region of 
the storage tank, inside the storage- building, blasting out-
ward. ( Tr. 129) Two factors must be present in order 
for an explosion to occur involving white gasoline. First, 
the gasoline must vaporize and reach a certain level 
called the lower explosion limit, a suitable mixture of 
vaporized gasoline in the air ; and second there must be 
a source of ignition. Unvaporized white gasoline will 
10 
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ignite, but not explode. A temperature of six or seven 
hundred degrees Fahrenheit is required to ignite this 
mixture, and a spark from a motor like the one present 
was adequate to ignite the mixture if the mixture was 
in the proper range. He said the conditions were right 
for an explosion. Filling a practically empty tank to the 
two-thirds level would flush out two-thirds of the vapors. 
Vapors being heavier than air, would roll off the tank 
(no vent pipe attached to carry them outside the build-
ing) and the only place they could accumulate without 
mixing with air would be on the side of the tank next 
to the building where there would be very little ventila-
tion. (Tr. 130-131) Dr. Cook said that a spark from the 
electric motor was a very likely probable cause of igni-
tion, that he saw no other evidence of any other source, 
although there could have been other sources, but none 
were found. The electric motor was completely ade-
quate source and a very likely one. In view of the par-
ticular proximity to the main part of the explosion and 
all other facts being considered it was his opinion that 
sparks from the motor were the cause of the explosion. 
(Tr. 131) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Cook testified that he was 
still convinced the explosion had occurred as he had pre-
viously indicated. (Tr. 140) He agreed with counsel for 
the plaintiff that if there were any wind blowing and the 
Yent pipe was attached, that the fumes would be carried 
a:way so that they could not come back down through 
the six-inch hole in the roof and get over back by the 
motor. (Tr. 141) He said this was highly unlikely and it 
11 
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was his opinion that the: vent pipe had been left off, caus 
ing the explosion as he had described it. (Tr. 141) 
Following this testimony it was stipulated that ·the 
capacity of the storage tank was 3240 gallons. After intro-
ducin~ certain colored picture slides, defendants rested. 
Plaintiffs then offered certain rebutta1 evidence, first 
from Mr. Leavitt, a distributor for Standard Oil Com-
pany of California. Mr. Leavitt said it was the general 
custom for the tank truck operator to remain in the im-
mediate area of the tank truck while it is dumping. {Tr. 
148) Leavitt said there was no custom with respect to 
what the operator of the service station does when de-
liveries are made. (Tr. 149) 
Dr. Bryner, Professor of chemistry at B. Y. U., in 
Provo was called as a rebuttal witness by the plaintiffs. 
He was asked to assume as facts, most of the physical 
evidence introduced at the trial plus the assumption that 
there was an extension of the vent stub which sticks out 
of the storage tank on the top, a rigid vent pipe extension, 
which extended through the roof from one to three feet, 
and that there was a breeze blowing during unloading 
operations. Assuming these and the many other recited 
facts he said it was his opinion that the gas fumes result-
ing from pumping gasoline into the storage tank while 
unloading the trailer would not have been responsible for 
the explosion. Next he was asked to assume that there was 
no extension on the vent stub. He again concluded that 
the fumesfrom the vent would not have accumulated and 
12 
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been ignited by the motor. (Tr. 155-158) Dr. Bryner 
concluded from the pictures of the fire that there was a 
breeze from the northwest. (Tr. 159) He also said that 
heat from the sun would tend to warm the air under the 
tin roof and because of radiation the air movement would 
be upward. (Tr. 159) Dr. Bryner concluded from the 
photographs of the fire that the explosion took place in 
the vicinity of the tank but outside of the storage build-
ing. (Tr. 163) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Bryner said there were 
two or three explosions. (Tr. 165) After the first explo-
sion there was no pipe on the vent stub as the jet fire 
was emitted from below the roof level. ( Tr. 167) He con-
cluded that there was no pipe screwed onto the vent stub 
otherwise there would have been a stripping of the 
threads if it had been blown off by the explosion. (Tr. 
169) From all Dr. Bryner knew about the evidence in this 
case it was his opinion that the vent pipe was not screwed 
onto the stub. (Tr. 169) Dr. Bryner said he didn't think 
an explosion would occur because of sparks from the par-
ticular motor involved as long as the motor was running. 
It will spark while starting or stopping only. (Tr. 170) 
On cross-examination Dr. Bryner reversed his direct tes-
timony and concluded that the explosion occurred inside 
the storage building, instead of outside. (Tr. 172-173) Dr. 
Bryner was asked what he thought was the source of the 
volatile vapors inside the storage building. He satid there 
were two possible sources, either a leaky fitting or a poor 
cownection on the pump. (Tr.177) One source was as good 
as the other as he didn't know which one was correct. 
13 
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(Tr. 177) Dr. Bryner found no evidence that gasoline had 
been forced by pumping, to overflow through the vent 
op top of the tank. (Tr. 179) Dr. Bryner was asked if he 
had an opinion as to the source of the ignition of the 
vapors. He said he would not venture am opinion on 
just exactly how ignition took place, that there were sev-
eral ways it could have occurred, but that it would be 
conjecture amd speculation to assume an.y one source. 
(Tr. 182) The motor could be a possible source. (Tr. 185) 
Dr. Bryner agreed that in most of the pumps and service 
stations vapor-proof motors are used. (Tr. 184) 
Dr. Cook testified on re-direct examination that the 
motor shown by Exhibit D-25 would give off sparks while 
it is in operation. ( Tr. 190) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AND 
DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE CONCLU-
SION OF RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE. 
PoiNT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VER-
DICT MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL 
EVIDENCE AND IN FAILING TO GIVE APPEL-
LANT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1, DIRECT-
ING THE JURY TO RETURN A DIRECTED 
VERDICT IN BEHALF OF APPELLANT. 
14 
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PoiNT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO.6 (R. 43), TO THE GIVING OF 
WHICH APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND 
WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: 
''If you find and believe by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence that the escape of white 
gasoline from any of the facilities used in trans-
ferring the same from the trailer tank of the 
Defendants to the tank of the Plaintiffs resulted 
from negligence on the part of Clayton Webb, 
the employee of the Defendants, and that such 
negligence was a proximate cause of one or more 
explosions and fire resulting in damage to the 
Plaintiffs, it is of no consequence that you do not 
determine the exact point at which the gasoline 
escaped, nor the exact manner in which it was 
ignited. If your minds are so satisfied by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence, then you should 
find a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs and 
against the Defendants unless your minds are 
also satisfied by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence that the Plaintiffs were guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in one or more of the particulars 
set forth in Instruction No. 3. '' 
PoiNT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR INSTRUC-
TION NO. 9 (R. 35), TO WHICH FAILURE 
APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND WHICH 
READS AS FOLLOWS: 
''Based upon the commonly known fact that 
the instinct for self-preservation is such that 
persons use ordinary and reasonable care for 
their own safety, the law permits you to assume 
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. that Clayton Webb, deceased, at the time of and 
immediately preceding the incident in question, 
-was exercising due care for his own safety. You 
may make findings in accordance therewith un-
.less you are persuaded from a preponderance of 
the evidence that he was guilty of negligence as 
·--elsewhere in these instructions defined.'' 
POlNT v 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE APPELLANT'S -REQUEST FOR INSTRUC-
TION NO .. 10 (R. 36), TO WHICH FAILURE 
APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND WHICH 
READS AS FOLLOWS: 
''You are instructed that where the precise 
cause of an accident on the whole evidence is left 
to conjecture or speculation, and which may be 
reasonably attributed to causes over which this 
defendant had no control, as to a cause for which 
this defendant would be responsible, then and in 
that event the plaintiff has failed to sustain its 
burden of proof, and if such you find the fact 
to be your verdict should be in favor of defend-
ant and against the lain tiff, no cause of action." 
ARGUMENT 
PorNr I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AND 
DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE CONCLU-
SION OF RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
,THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VER-
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DICT MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL 
EVIDENCE AND IN FAILING TO GIVE APPEL-
LANT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1, DIRECT-
ING THE JURY TO. RETURN A DIRECTED 
VERDICT IN BEHALF OF APPELLANT. 
Points Nos. I and II will be argued together for the 
reason that both points involve substantially the same 
argument on both the facts and the law. 
The erroneous application of the facts and the law 
in this case is clearly shown by the trial court's decision 
and order filed April 19, 1960 (R. 66-67). The court's 
decision is as follows : 
''Notwithstanding the fact that the evidence 
does not disclose the manner in which gasoline or 
vapors arising therefrom were ignited, and not-
withstanding the fact that the jury might on the 
evidence conclude that sparks from the motor pro-
vided by the Plaintiffs for operating the pump 
used in transferring the gasoline from the Defend-
ants' tanker to the storage tank of the Plaintiffs 
might have ignited the gasoline or vapors there-
from, I conclude that a jury may without specula-
tion and conjecture conclude: That the standard of 
care required in transferring the gasoline from the 
trailer tank of the Defendants to the storage tank 
of the plaintiffs required that the agent of the De-
fendants remain at all times within such proximity 
of the unloading operations that he could give im-
mediate attention to any failure in the instrumen-
talities involved; that the agent of the Defendants 
started the pump, and after it was started left 
the scene of the unloading operation and went to 
a nearby restaurant and that while he was not 
present at the unloading operation gasoline es-
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caped and flowed a dist(J!Ybce of from 200 to 350 
feet from the storage tarnk; that had the defend· 
ants' a,gent rem.a,ined in view of the 11/Yiloading op-
erations the escape of gasoline could have been 
stopped or prevented; that it was the escape of 
gasoline that was the proximate cause of the ex-
plosion and resulting fire." (Emphasis supplied) 
It is evident from the court's decision that he as-
sumed (a) that the defendant's employee was not pres-
ent at the unloading operation while gasoline escaped, 
and that (b) had he been there personally the escape of 
gasoline could have been stopped or prevented. 
There is absolutely no evidence upon which to base 
these assumptions; and it further assumes that if the em-
ployee of the appellant had been near his equipment that 
he could have done something to have stopped or pre-
vented the explosion. The facts in the case show that at 
the time of the explosion the employee Clayton Webb 
was with his equipment. This is shown by the fact that 
at the time of the explosion he was seen running out from 
between his truck and the building. There is no evidence 
of any kind from which it could he determined how long 
he had been at that place. It is true that at the com-
mencement of the unloading operation he was seen hav-
ing a cup of coffee in the nearby restaurant, but at the 
time the employees of the service station left, and at the 
last time we know of this employee prior to the explo-
sion, no gasoline was escaping. From that moment on, as 
far as the evidence in this case is concerned, Clayton 
Webb could have been and \vas with his equipment. At 
this point the trial court allowed the jury to speculate and 
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conjecture concerning the location and the activity of the 
deceased employee. This, of course, has never been al-
lowed by this court as set forth in a series of cases which 
have been definite, well-defined a.nd uniform regarding the 
problem of conjecture and speculation in attempting to 
prove negligent acts and the causation factor. These 
cases are as follows: 
Spackman v. Ben,efit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 97 
Utah 91, 89 P. 2d 490. 
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P. 
2d 680. 
Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P. 2d 566. 
Olsen v. Warwood, 123 Utah 111, 255 P. 2d 725. 
Forrest v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P. 2d 178. 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. 
Illustrative of all these cases we quote from the lan-
guage in Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, 103 Utah 44, 132 P. 
2d 680, as follows : 
''While deductions may be based on probabili-
ties, the evidence must do more than merely raise 
a conjecture or show a probability. Where there 
are probabilities the other way equally or more 
potent the deductions are mere guesses and the 
jury should not be permitted to speculate. The 
rule is well established in this jurisdiction that 
where 'the proximate cause of the injury is left to 
conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of 
law.' Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Utah 189, 
170 P. 80, 84; Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 
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· Utah 72, 257 P. 1066. Mariy cases are cited in sup-
port of this proposition and the court quoted with 
approval from 29 Cyc. 625 where it is stated : 'The 
evidence . must, however, do more than merely 
raise a conjecture or show a probability as to the 
cause of the injury, and no recovery can be had if 
the· evidence leaves it to conjecture which of two 
probable causes resulted in the injury, where de-
fendant was liable for only one of them.' '' 
Other than the unfounded assumptions of the trial 
court and jury it could just as well be assumed that the 
deceased driver was at the place of the unloading opera-
tion and had no knowledge of any escaping gasoline or 
fumes. In this regard the evidence showed that the truck 
was alongside the building or shed, and that there was a 
wall between the truck and the tank and its pump. It is 
further just as consistent to assume that at the time of 
the explosion· the deceased was engaged in doing every-
thing he could under what circumstances were present. 
In applying the law the trial court failed and refused 
to apply the assumption, in absence of any substantial 
evidence, that the deceased employee was exercising due 
care as required by the case of Meacham v. Allen, 1 Utah 
2d 79, 262 Pac. 2d 285, as follows : 
"From the basic fact that a human being was acci-
dentally killed a preumption arises which required 
the trier of the facts to assume the presumed facts, 
that decedent used due care for his own safety, in 
the abence of a prima facie showing to the con-
trary. * * * '' 
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Also Holla;nd v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 
2d 303, 293 Pac. 2d 700: 
''If one surveys the picture through the eyes of 
suspicion with a preconceived notion that he con-
nived with Moreton, it is possible to create a fabric 
of conjecture upon which to believe that Mathesius 
wilfully assisted Moreton in deceiving the Hol-
lands. But it seems to me that if one is willing to 
indulge the presumption of right conduct, until 
some evidence definitely indicatingthe contrary is 
shown, which presumption Mathesius is entitled to 
have indulged in his behalf. * * *" 
To paraphrase the Holland case, one must need be 
engaged in a preconceived suspicion concerning the activ-
ities of the deceased driver. It seems to defendant that if 
the Court is willing to indulge the preumption of right 
conduct, which the deceased is entitled to, that his activi-
ties are understandable on the basis of non-negligence. 
Again, there is no susbtantial evidence of any kind to 
destroy these preumptions. 
Appellant recognizes the fact that in deciding the 
motions discussed, the court was required to look at the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
However, this rule has never been regarded nor used to 
furnish evidence necessary to a plaintiff's cause of action. 
It has never substituted for the failure to present evidence 
material to a cause of action nor evidence which fails to 
meet the criteria of the Sumsion case. 
The nearest that plaintiff came to proving causation 
was by the testimony of respondent's expert, Dr. Bryner: 
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'' Q. Where the, how this mixture got in the air at 
a certain place inside the storage house~ 
''A. Well, as I see it there are two possible 
sources. Either from a leaky fitting or poor 
connection on the pump. Or an over flow of 
the tank. 
'' Q. Is one as likely as the other in your mind~ 
''A. There is a good possibility that one would be 
just as good as the other because I don't 
know. Have any testimony as to whether the 
tank was full or not~ That just, I've heard 
that the, they measure the gas before they 
put it in. (Tr. 177) 
* * * * * 
"Q. But, perhaps I am repeating myself, and I 
want to make it definitely clear that the pos-
sibility of the source (Tr. 178), or reaction 
that might explode, creating a condition that 
would explode would be either leaky and im-
proper fittings on the pump or overflowing~ 
''A. Or the, it could be on the hose connection is 
what I made it out to be a possibility. I don't 
know. 
'' Q. And you say one is just as possible as the 
other~ 
''A. The gasoline got out there, that's all I know. 
(Tr. 179) 
* * * * * 
'' Q. What I am trying to get is do you have any 
idea of the specific source~ 
"A. I don't think I'd venture an opinion on just 
exactly how it was ignited. There are pos-
sibilities, but the exact way it was ignited, 
there are several ways it possibly could. Cig-
arette, or-
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'' Q. I am speaking, you have forgotten I said from 
the facts you know in this case. ( Tr. 181) 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. And I gather you have no idea of the source 
of the ignition 1 
"A. Well what you want me to say is that the 
motor that ignited it, but -
'' Q. Please don't do that to me. I'm not asking 
you to say anything-. 
" A. But I wouldn't say that because. 
"Q. I want to clear that up, Doctor, I'm asking 
you to say what is in your mind. 
''A. Well my mind-
'' Q. I don't appreciate that inference. 
"A. I don't have an opinion as to exactly what 
ignited it. 
'' Q. And all you can do in regard to the source of 
ignition would engage in conjecture and 
speculation, is that right 1 
"A. That's right. (Tr. 182) 
This Court, as late as August 15, 1960, in the case of 
Price v. Ashley's, Inc. ______ Utah ______ , 354 P. 2d 1064, again 
reasserted the principle of law involved in this case. 
''With two or more possible causes such as an 
inattentive driver and a mechanical defect that 
would have made it harder to turn proof that it 
may have been either is not proof that it was in 
fact either. No evidence indicated that either cause 
was the more probable.'' 
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As the evidence was concluded in this case the ap-
pellant submits that the substantial evidence was as 
follows: 
(a) The tanker was hooked up to the pumping opera-
tions and the pumping operations were started. 
(b) The appellant's employee Clayton Webb, de-
ceased, was seen in the nearby restaurant having a cup 
of coffee. 
(c) After appellant's employee was seen having his 
coffee, employees of respondent passed the pumping 
operations and there was no evidence of escaping 
gasoline. 
(d) Sometime later when the explosion occurred, the 
appellant's employee was in and about his equipment and 
the place of the unloading operation. 
(e) That the explosion was caused by the white gas 
in a vapor form and was more probably ignited by the 
dangerous and unsafe electrical motor operating the 
pump. 
It is submitted from this state of the evidence that 
the trial. court should have granted appellant's motions 
above mentioned. 
PoiNT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO.6 (R. 43), TO THE GIVING OF 
WHICH APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND 
WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: 
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''If you find and believe by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence that the escape of white 
gasoline from any of the facillties used in trans-
ferring the same from the trailer tank of the 
Defendants to the tank of the Plaintiffs resulted 
from negligence on the part of Clayton Webb, 
the employee of the Defendants, and that such 
negligence was a proximate cause of one or more 
explosions and fire resulting in damage to the 
Plaintiffs, it is of no consequence that you do not 
determine the exact point at which the gasoline 
escaped, nor the exact manner in which it was 
ignited. If your minds are so satisfied by a fa;i.r 
preponderance of the evidence, then you should 
find a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs and 
against the Defendants unless your minds are 
also satisfied by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence that the Plaintiffs were guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in one or more of the particulars 
set in Instruction No. 3." (Emphasis supplied) 
The practical and reasonable effect was to tell the 
jury that it was of no importance to them as to the man-
ner in which gasoline escaped or how the fumes were 
ignited. This, of course, was the specific problem of the 
entire lawsuit. It is of interest to note that in the case of 
Hooper v. General Motors Corporation, 123 Utah 515, 260 
Pac. 2d 549, that this court held the following instruction 
erroneous and prejudicial : 
" 'You are instructed that the fact that the 
rim and spider were found in a separated condi-
tion after the accident is no evidence of the fact 
that they were defective, unsound or unsafe when 
assembled and sold by defendant, General Motors 
Corporation, nor is it evidence of the fact that the 
separating of the rim and spider caused the truck 
to go out of control and overturn.' '' (Emphasis 
supplied) 
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It appears to appellant that Instruction No. 6 has 
the identical effect as the instruction in the Hooper case. 
Paraphrasing this case, the instruction No.6 as given by 
the court withdrew from the jury facts which involved two 
requisite elements of plaintiff's cause. 
PoiNT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR INSTRUC-
TION NO. 9 (R. 35), TO WHICH FAILURE 
APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND WHICH 
READS AS FOLLOWS: 
''Based upon the commonly known fact that 
the instinct for self-preservation is such that 
persons use ordinary and reasonable care for 
their own safety, the law permits you to assume 
that Clayton Webb, deceased, at the time of and 
immediately.preceding the incident in question, 
was exercising due care for his own safety. You 
may make findings in accordance therewith un-
less you are persuaded from a preponderance of 
the evidence that he was guilty of negligence as 
elsewhere in these instructions defined.'' 
The court will note from the Statement of Facts that 
the appellant's agent and employee was burned to death 
in this accident without being able to relate his knowl-
eoge of the occurrence. The requested instruction was 
taken from instruction form No. 16.8 of Jury Instruction 
Forms, Utah, and the cases cited thereunder. In refus-
ing this instruction, and reading the court's instructions 
as a whole, the trial court not only failed to advise the 
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jury as to this assumption, but, in effect, advised them 
that they could assume the opposite; that is, that in ab-
sence of any substantial evidence the jury could assume 
that the deceased was careless and negligent. The cases 
cited under the above-mentioned form 16.8 are as follows: 
Tuttle v. P. I. E., 121 Utah 420, 242 P. 2d 764. 
Lewis v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 P. 97. 
Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285. 
PoiNT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR INSTRUC-
TION NO. 10 (R. 36), TO WHICH FAILURE 
APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND WHICH 
READS AS FOLLOWS: 
''You are instructed that where the precise 
cause of an accident on the whole evidence is left 
to conjecture or speculation, and which may be 
reasonably attributed to causes over which this 
defendant had no control, as to a cause for which 
this defendant would be responsible, then and in 
that event the plaintiff has failed to sustain its 
burden of proof, and if such you find the fact 
to be your verdict should be in favor of defend-
ant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action.'' 
This point has been substantially argued under 
Points I and II, and appellant again adopts the law and 
cases set forth in those points. The requested instruc-
tion, in substance, is set forth in Form 2.3 of Jury In-
struction Forms, Utah. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent has wholly and totally failed to establish 
the fact of negligence and proximate causation. If any 
explanation was given for the explosion occurrence it was 
done by appellants on a basis of freedom from negli-
gence. As evidence was concluded, respondent failed to 
prove, e.ven by any reasonable inference, the cause of the 
explosion, or any acts of commission or omission of 
appellant to establish any cause or relation between the 
alleged negligent acts and explosion. In this case the 
jury did nothing more than to engage in the wildest kind 
of speculation, surmise and conjecture. 
The instructions. complained of in the case were of no 
assistance to the jury and could not establish any reason-
able set of standards by which the evidence could be 
adjudged, but, on the contrary, tended to confuse the 
proper applicable legal principles. Appellant submits the 
trial court erred in the various rulings and acts set forth 
herein and presented and argued. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM, 
Attorneys for Appella;nt 
307 Utah Oil Bldg., 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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